C. 1321

<¶> As the Attorney General recognized in 2008 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No.2008–036, at *4, H.B. 545 itself, at least implicitly, recognized the existence of an alternative statutory authority available to lenders previously licensed under the Check–Cashing Lender Law. See H.B. 545, Section 4(B) (requiring a licensee under the Check–Cashing Lender Law who applied for a license under the Small Loan Act for the 2008 licensing period to pay only half the license fee required by R.03).

<¶>In an attempt to paint the STLA as the exclusive statutory authority for payday-type loans, amici in support of appellee argue that reading the MLA in pari materia with the STLA clarifies the General Assembly’s intent. In the absence of statutory ambiguity, however, we may not resort to rules of statutory interpretation. See State ex rel. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 182, 186, 724 N.E.2d 771 (2000) (no need to apply interpretive rules to unambiguous statutory language); State v. Krutz, 28 Ohio St.3d 36, 37–38, 502 N.E.2d 210 (1986) (in pari materia rule applies only when a statute is ambiguous or the significance of its terms is doubtful).

Wolfe v

<¶>Beyond the absence of language in the STLA restricting MLA lenders in any way, R.57(A) authorizes MLA registrants to contract for and receive interest on MLA loans “[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) “Notwithstanding” indicates the General Assembly’s intention that R.57(A) takes precedence over any contrary statute purporting to limit a registrant’s authority. See State ex rel. Carmean v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Edn., 170 Ohio St. 415, 422, 165 N.E.2d 918 (1960); Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (“a ‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any other section”). The precedence afforded a “notwithstanding” clause is effective regardless of whether that clause predates the conflicting provision. See State ex rel. PIA Psych. Hosps., Inc. v. Ohio Certificate of Need Rev. Bd., 60 Ohio St.3d 11, 17–18, 573, 573 N.E.2d 14 N.E.3d 14 (1991) (holding that a later-adopted bill did nothing to change the General Assembly’s intent that certificate-of-need applications were governed by an earlier Louisiana auto title loans bill, which included a “notwithstanding” provision).

<¶>The court of appeals’ supposition concerning the legislative intention behind the STLA, emphasized here by amici in support of appellee, cannot override the unambiguous statutory language of R.57(A). Indeed, the legislature, not the courts, should resolve any incongruity between the legislature’s intent and the statutory language enacted. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Allen Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 32 Ohio St.3d 24, 28, 512 N.E.2d 332 (1987). The question is not what the General Assembly intended to enact but the meaning of that which it did enact. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004–Ohio–969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 12, quoting Slingluff, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, at paragraph two of the syllabus.

<¶>In over five years since the enactment of the STLA, the General Assembly has not taken any action to preclude the practice of payday-style lending under the other lending acts in effect prior to the STLA. As we have previously noted, legislative inaction in the face of knowledge of longstanding statutory interpretation may suggest a legislative intent to retain existing law. Maitland v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ohio St.3d 463, 2004–Ohio–5717, 816 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 26. Here, the General Assembly’s acquiescence to the status quo contradicts the court of appeals’ determination that the General Assembly intended the STLA to be the exclusive legislation governing the type of short-term, single-installment loans at issue here.